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With the development of coal on federal lands, the author anticipates policy conflicts between state and federal interests. Using Wyoming as an example, the author analyzes the nature of the state's
interests in terms of Wyoming's environmental and land use legislation. The author then turns to limitations upon the state's power to
regulate federal coal lands. Finally, the author examines the utility of
the Preemption Doctrine for resolving policy conflicts.

ACCOMMODATION OR PREEMPTION?
STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF
PRIVATE COAL LANDS IN WYOMING*
Stephen D. Alfers**
I. INTRODUCTION

In November of 1974 the Federal Energy Administration presented its Project Independence Blueprint, an implementation plan for the President's version of a national
strategy to eliminate or reduce very substantially U.S. dependence on foreign oil by the year 1985. Experts now question whether true independence is either attainable' or desirable.' Nevertheless, political imperatives, both national and
international, would appear to assure a substantial role for
coal in an emerging national energy resources strategy. The
Copyright@ 1977 by the University of Wyoming.

*The author wishes to express his gratitude to Messrs. Jack M. Merritts and
Theodore E. Worcester of Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard, who read the
manuscript and made many helpful suggestions. The views presented are
those of the author and he alone is responsible for any omissions or errors.
**Associate, Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colorado; B.A. 1968,
University of Denver; M.A. 1973, University of Denver; J.D. 1976, University
of Virginia; admitted to practice Colorado 1976; member of Colorado and
Denver Bar Associations.
1. See FRANSSEN, TowARD PROJECT INTERDEPENDENCE: ENERGY IN THE COMING
DECADE vii. (1975) [hereinafter cited as FRANSSEN].
2.

WILLRICH, ENERGY AND WORLD POLITICS (1975).
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Franssen study concluded that a demand exists for substitutes
for the increasingly unreliable supply of domestic petroleum.
Hence energy consumption increases will have to be
met increasingly by substitute sources such as coal
and nuclear power, and by imports of crude oil and
liquefied natural gas .... It will probably not be until the latter part of the century or early in the 21st
century that solar energy, fusion power, and so forth
will make a significant contribution to total energy
output.'
Energy supply strategies are founded on an assumed
energy mix of petroleum, including natural gas, coal, and
nuclear power. Since any shortfall in projected production
of coal or nuclear power must be met in increases in petroleum
imports, it appears that coal with nuclear energy will be
the focus of accelerated energy resource development for the
remainder of the 20th century.
Just as political imperatives give rise to the demand
for coal, economic imperatives translate that need into a
demand for western coal. Until very recently, the cost of
transporting western coal from Montana, North Dakota and
Wyoming to remote markets relegated western coal to a
small share of national coal production. However, broadbased national concern with deep mine safety and the impact
of the shift to coal on air quality4 has cut substantially into
the comparative advantage previously enjoyed by Appalachian coal.5
Despite considerable immediate economic uncertainties
about the future of coal development stemming from an abFRANSSEN, supra note 1, at 15.
4. Much of the attraction of western coal has been related to its reputed
low sulfur content, which makes it compatible with existing clean air
standards. For a discussion doubting the reliability of that premise, see
RIEBER, Low SULFUR COAL: A REVISION OF RESOURCE AND SUPPLY ESTIMATES, (Center for Advance Computation Doc. No. 88) (1973), and McCormick, Facts About Coal in the United States, Environmental Policy
Center, Washington, D.C. (1974).
5. See Hardesty, et al., Symposium: New Values of Coal, 76 W. VA. L. REV.
255 (1974); Natural Resources Symposium, 51 N.D.L. REy. 249 (1974);
Leisenring, Western Coal--The Sleeping Giant, 19 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST.
1 (1974).
3.
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sence of any clear statement of national energy policy,' increases in coal production have come and very likely will continue to come from western coal mines. If national production is to increase from 1974 levels of 600 million tons per
year to projected levels of 900 million tons per year by 1985,'
production of western coal mines must double.
Resource Ownership Patternsin Western Coal Lands
Coal has always been the ugly stepsister in the federal
mineral and public land laws. The mineral location system
embodied in the General Mining Law of 1872 gave prospectors
on the public lands minerals and surface necessary for their
exploitation, upon discovery thereof in commercial quantities.' The objective of the location system was to accelerate
exploration and development of the mineral wealth in the
American west.'
On the other hand, in the early 19th century disposal of coal lands was effected under the surface entry laws
beginning with the Preemption Act of 1841.10 The Preemption Act excepted from entry those lands containing "known
mines and salines." Until 1864, known coal lands with coal
deposits in quantities not amounting to a "known mine" were
subject to entry and purchase. The Congress codified that
construction in 1864.11 The Coal Lands Entry Act of 187312
controlled disposal of coal lands until 1920.
In contrast to the General Mining Law enacted one year
before, the Coal Lands Entry Act of 1873 is regarded as a
vestige of earlier policies of disposal by sale. The central
6. See, e.g., Spore, Economic Problens of Coal Surface Mining, 2 ENVIR. AFF.
685 (1973).
7. The FEA in Project Independence Blueprint called for a doubling of coal
production to 1.2 billion tons per year by 1985. Estimates now put maximum coal production in 1985 at 900 million tons per year. FRANSSEN,
supra note 1, at 16-17
8. For a thorough discussion of interests in mineral lands from possessory interests of pedis possessio to title of patentees see Sherwood and Greer,
Mining Law in a Nuclear Age: The Wyoming Example, 3 LAND & WATER
L. REv. 1 (1968), and Sherwood and Greer, Posessory Interests in Wyoming Mining Claims, 4 LAND & WATEa L. R-v. 337 (1969).
9.

AMERICAN LAW OF MINING,

§ 2.16.

10. 5 Stat. 453 (1841).
11. Act of July 1, 1864, 13 Stat. 343 (1864); amended Act of March 3, 1865,
13 Stat. 529 (1865).
12. 17 Stat. 607 (1873), 30 U.S.C. §§ 71-76 (1970).
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objective of the Coal Lands Entry Act was to permit development of the critical energy resource of the age, while thwarting the growth of monopolies.1"
The severed mineral pattern of ownership which exists
today in western coal lands can be traced to early attempts
at multiple use of the public lands. On the one hand the nonmineral entry laws1" sought to encourage settlement of the
public domain by making it available for agricultural purposes. On the other hand the Coal Lands Entry Act sought to
encourage orderly development of Western coal. From the
start the two policies fell somewhat short of a hand-in-glove
fit. In Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. United States," the
Supreme Court held that lands containing known coal mines
were not subject to entry under the homestead laws. After
the turn of the century a massive inventory of resources on
public lands resulted in classification of much land as coal
lands. Diamond Coke & Coal Co. v. United States16 made
clear what agricultural interests had for several years
feared; the Court held that patents to lands containing coal
deposits issued under the homestead laws were subject to
annulment by the government if it could be shown that at the
time the patents issued the lands contained known coal deposits which could be extracted at a profit. Established agricultural uses of entrymen appeared to be threatened by subsequent discovery of coal.
Congress resolved the dilemma by severing the coal from
the entryman's estate. A 1909 Amendment to the Coal Lands
Entry Act, surviving in Section 81 of Title 30 of the United
States Code, provided that locators or entrymen and selectmen under the non-mineral entry laws could obtain new patents to lands determined to contain coal. However if the
lands had been determined subsequently to be chiefly valuable
for coal, the patents would contain a reservation to the United
AMERICAN LAW OF MINING, § 2.16.
14. For a complete treatment of statutes providing for patent of the surface
subject to reservation of the minerals, see Twitty, Law of Subjacent Support
and the Right to Totally Destroy Surface in Mining Operations, 6 ROCKY
MT. MIN. L. INST. 497, 513 n.45 (1961).
15. 123 U.S. 307 (1887).
16. 233 U.S. 236 (1914).
13.
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States of the right to dispose of the coal under the Coal Lands
Entry Act. Lands withdrawn or classified as coal lands and
not otherwise reserved, except those in Alaska, were opened
to entry under the non-mineral entry laws, providing that
title to such lands would pass to the entrymen subject to federal coal reservations.17 The Secretary of the Interior obtained power to dispose of coal so reserved in 1917."8
The development of the severed coal estate was occurring
at a time when public lands disposal policy was undergoing
a serious rethinking. Disposal policy shifted directions radically in 1920 away from a policy favoring exploitation of
western mineral wealth to one favoring conservation. The
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920," withdrew from location under
the General Mining Law or from entry and sale under the
Coal Lands Entry Act, deposits of coal, phosphates, sodium,
potassium, oil, oil shale, gas, native asphalt, bitumen and
bituminous rock, and the lands containing them. Thus,
title to surface obtained after 1920 was subject to disposal
of the coal by lease by the Secretary of the Interior. °
Rights of the Surface Owner Against the Mineral Owner
For all its expediency and apparent contributions to the
multiple use concept, the reservation of minerals raises serious legal obstacles to development of federal coal.2 1 Mineral
reservations create a complex of rights to the use of the surface underlain by coal owned outright by the federal government or leased under the Mineral Leasing Act. The clash
of ranchers and mining interests is set in perhaps its most
stark motif in the coal basins in the Northern Great Plains
Regions of Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming. There
the strip mining interests are not seeking to use the surface,
17. 36 Stat. 583 (1910), 30 U.S.C. §§ 83-85 (1970); 37 Stat. 90 (1912), 30
U.S.C. § 77 (1970).
18. 39 Stat. 945 (1917), 30 U.S.C. § 88 (1970).
19. 41 Stat. 437 (1920), 80 U.S.C. § 181 et. seq. (1970).
20. For an interesting discussion of problems associated with commingled
minerals subject to competing disposal laws, see Vlautin, To Lease or to
Locate, 19 RocxY MT. MIN. L. INST. 393, 406 (1974).
21.

Perhaps the most thorough exposition of the problem in current literature
is found in Mall, Federal Mineral Reservations, 10 LAND & WATER L.

REV. 1 (1975) ; see also Brimmer, The Ranchers Subservient Surface Estate,
5 LAND & WATER L. REv. 49 (1970); Fleck, Severed Mineral Interests, 51
N.D.L. REv. 369 (1975).
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but to use it exclusively for substantial periods of time. In
some cases strip mining is tantamount to destruction.2 2
Courts commonly hold that the mineral estate is the dominant estate and the mineral owners enjoy an implied easement for ingress and egress in the use of surface reasonably
necessary to the enjoyment of the mineral estate.2" Few
courts go so far as Sun Oil Co. v Whitaker,4 which permitted
the oil and gas owner to take without compensation groundwater for its secondary recovery operations. The majority
of courts follow instead Barker v. Mintz" which held that the
servient surface estate may not enjoin the mineral operator
but that he is entitled to damages. Since much of western
coal lands is patented under the Stock Raising Homestead
Act, or SRHA, as a practical matter in many cases, the entryman's damages are limited by statute to the value of crops,
improvements, and grazing value, and not market value of
the land."5
Powerful arguments can be raised asserting the surface
owners' reasonable expectations, under technologies extant
at the time their patents issued, that any mining would be
deep mining perhaps resulting in subsidence but not strip
mining resulting in permanent impairment to the value of
the surface. One commentator has said, "it is clear Congress
intended that the holder of the mineral estate should be able
to destroy surface if required by his mining operation to do
Ferguson argues that the statutory remedy should
SO. )27
be the entrymen's or surface patentee's exclusive remedy,
pointing to long-standing policies favoring mineral development.28 However, the right of the mineral owner to destroy
22. The rehabilitation potential of stripped western coal lands is a matter of
controversy. See, in general, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, REHABILITATION POTENTIAL OF WESTERN COAL LANDS (1974).
23. Twitty, supra note 14, at 501-502.
24. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Texas 1972).
25. Barker v. Mintz, '73 Colo 262, 215 P. 534 (1923).
26. The two leading cases, which together throw a corral around the damages
recoverable by the surface owner are Kinney Coastal Oil Co. v. Kiefer,
277 U.S. 488 (1928), and Holbrook v. Continental Oil Co., 73 Wyo. 321, 278
P.2d 798 (1955).
27. Ferguson, Severed Surface and Mineral Estates: The Right to Use or
Destroy the Surface to Recover Minerals, 19 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 411
(1974).
28. Id. at 429.
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the surface is not nearly so clear to at least one student notewriter."' He argues that the SRHA was intended to modify
the common law right of the mineral owner to the reasonable
use of the surface by making the mineral estate strictly liable
for stated limited damages to the surface. The notewriter
would permit damages at common law in addition to those for
crops, improvements, and grazing value."
Wyoming is but one of the western states experiencing
considerable coal mining activity. Its coal resources are extensive, and to a large extent underlie private lands patented
under the various agricultural entry statutes, subject to federal coal reservations. The Wyoming legislature in the late
1960's moved to regulate surface mining activity, responding
to demands for environmental protection and claims by agricultural interests that federal legislation has compensated
inadequately surface owners subjected to mining of federal
coal.
Motivated by national imperatives for relative energy
independence consistent with environmental protection, the
federal government has moved to regulate surface mining in
the Western states, at least to the extent federal coal or federal lands are involved. Since the leasing moratorium in
1973, the Department of the Interior has been developing a
policy for the progress of the coal industry in the Northern
Great Plains. In the past year, the Secretary has promulgated regulations which cover coal leasing and coal mining
operation and reclamation. Under the regulations the Secretary for the first time extends his regulatory powers to private lands underlain by federal coal. On August 4, 1976, the
Congress, over an Administration veto, passed the Federal
Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, legislating its special
concerns with royalties, monopoly and environmental protection.
29. Note, Surface Damages from Strip Mining Under the Stock Raising
See also Note, Protection of
Homestead Act, 50 DEN. L.J. 369 (1973).
Surface Owners of Federally Reserved Mineral Lands, 2 UCLA-ALASA L.
REV. 171 (1973).
30. Note, Surface Damages from Strip Mining Under the Stock Raising Honestead Act, supra note 29, at 373.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977

7

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 12 [1977], Iss. 1, Art. 2
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XII

Reconciling environmental concerns with their energy
parameters very likely will continue to involve the states and
the federal government, each pursuing its own mandate. The
object of this article is to examine in light of the supremacy
clause the power of the states to regulate under the police
power the lands owned by its citizens within its boundaries
but which are held subject to reservations to the United States
of the underlying coal and other minerals.
Since Wyoming is a state with an abundance of federal
coal and considerable land area held subject to the federal interest in the coal beneath it, the Wyoming experience seems
an appropriate focus for a study of federalism and western
coal. Part II of this article surveys the Wyoming approach
to regulating surface mining. Part III considers the supremacy clause as a limit to state control of surface mining
of federal coal. Part IV considers the preemption of Wyoming surface mining legislation in light of recent Supreme
Court decisions.
II. STATE CONTROL OVER THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES

The Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality
Prior to analyzing the conflicting state and federal interests in the mining and reclamation of Wyoming coal lands,
this article will examine the existing regulatory system found
in Wyoming. The extent to which the present state system
fulfills the requirements of an adequate scheme of regulation
and evinces an abiding state interest in that area is illustrated
by the following discussion of licensing procedures and land
use planning. Whether federal preemption is justified depends, in large part, on the sufficiency of laws and practices
now implemented in Wyoming under the State's police powers.
Surface mining is regulated directly by the State of
Wyoming through its Department of Environmental Quality
(DEQ) under the Open Cut Reclamation Act of 1969, and
the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act (WEQ)."' The
31. Wyo.

STAT.

§ 35-502.1 et. seq. (Supp. 1975).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol12/iss1/2
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legislation centralized administration of its statutory and
administrative controls over environmental protection.
The WEQ Act tasks its day-to-day administration to the
DEQ. The Director of DEQ is charged with enforcing the
act and rules, regulations, orders, standards, permits, and
licenses issued thereunder."2 The Director assigns studies
and investigations, administers funds, and represents the
state in all matters relating to environmental protection.
The Director has the power to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke
mining permits and licenses."
Under the Director, environmental regulation is effected
through three divisions and their respective advisory boards:
Air, Water, and Land Quality Divisions.3" The Administrator of the Land Quality Division is charged with administering the WEQ Act with respect to mineral extraction. The
Administrator supervises studies, investigations, surveys,
and research projects assigned by the Director, and reports
results to him and to the Land Quality Advisory Board. The
Administrator receives applications for mining permits and
mining licenses and, in turn, recommends their disposition
to the Director. 5 The Administrator fixes the amount of the
reclamation performance bond. Upon forfeiture of such a
bond, the Administrator is tasked to carry out reclamation of
abandonded lands. The Administrator may propose rules,
regulations, and standards to the Director. The Administrator is the ex officio Executive Secretary of the Land Quality
Advisory Board. 6
The Advisory Board is composed of five members appointed by the Governor, one each to represent industry,
agriculture, and the political subdivisions. Two members
are to represent the "public interest."3 The Advisory Board
is to work closely with the Administrator "in the administra32. WYO. STAT. § 35-502.9(i) (Supp. 1975).
33. WYO. STAT. § 35.502.10(a)ii (Supp. 1975); Wyo.
(Supp. 1975). But see Wyo. STAT. § 35-502.24(h)
authority to grant issue, or deny mining permits to
34. WYO. STAT. § 25-502.5 (Supp. 1975); Wyo. STAT.
1975).
35. Wyo. STAT. § 85-502.22(iv) (Supp. 1975).
86. WYO. STAT. § 25-502.10(i) (Supp. 1975).
37. Wyo. STAT. § 35-502.13(a) (Supp. 1975).
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tion and performance of all duties of the division." 8 The
Board makes an annual report to the Governor. The Board
has authority to recommend to the Environmental Quality
Council, through the Administrator and the Director, rules,
regulations, standards, plans, and programs for pollution
abatement and prevention.
The Environmental Quality Council acts as an independent regulatory commission to promulgate, upon recommendation from the Director and Advisory Boards, all rules,
regulations, orders, and standards necessary to the enforcement of WEQ 9 The Council is the hearing examiner in
cases contesting virtually any administrative action of the
DEQ. The Council hears and decides contests to the grant,
denial, suspension, revocation, renewal, or variance from
any mining permit or license. The Council has the authority
to designate areas "of a unique and irreplaceable, historical,
archaeological, scenic or natural value."4 The significance
of that designation is that any irreparable harm to such an
area will support, without more, a denial of a mining permit.4 The legal arm of the council is the state Attorney
General.2
The WEQ manages surface mining through a permit
and licensing process which pits against one another the interests of the mineral owner, the surface owner, the mine operator, and the public. The statutory approach, in contrast
with federal mining and land law discussed above, tilts the
balance substantially in favor of the surface interests.
Under the WEQ the "mining permit is the certification
that the tract of land described therein may be mined by an
operator licensed to do so in conformance with an approved
reclamation plan."4 " The permit may be transferred with
approval of the Director or, if rejected by the Director, by
WYo. STAT. § 35-502.14(c) (Supp. 1975).
WYO. STAT. § 35-502.11-12 (Supp. 1975).
40. WYO. STAT. § 35-502.12(v) (Supp. 1975).
41. WYO. STAT. § 25-502.24(g) (iv) (Supp. 1975).
42. WYO. STAT. § 35-502.12(e) (Supp. 1975). The statute also allows independent counsel to be employed.
43. WYo. STAT. § 35-502.23 (Supp. 1975).
38.
39.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol12/iss1/2
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the Council." An application for a mining permit is filed
with the Administrator of Land Quality. The application
must contain a general ecological, geographic, and geological
description of the land. In addition, the application must
contain a reclamation plan showing the extent of disturbance
contemplated, proposed future uses, proposed future land
contours, and proposed revegetation. The application must
set out proposed technology for separating the topsoil from
the subsoil and for preventing wind and water erosion of
spoil piles and topsoil piles. 5
The application must be accompanied by written consent of the surface owner, if other than the applicant. 6 In
the absence of consent of the surface owner the applicant
may request a hearing from the Council and seek an order in
lieu of consent. The Council may not issue an order in lieu
of consent if the surface owner can show inter alia that mining substantially prohibits his operations. 7
In 1975 the Wyoming Legislature amended Section 35502.24, introducing a new requirement for "home ranch"
approval both to the commencement of surface mining operations and to the applicant's mining and reclamation plan.48
The Legislature drew a distinction between surface mining
dislocating surface owners actually residing on the land and
that involving surface owned by absentees or "gentlemen
farmers."4 While applicants frustrated by a non-residential
or non-agricultural surface landowners' refusal to consent
may continue to seek from the Council orders in lieu of con44. WYo. STAT. § 35-502.25 (Supp. 1975). See Wyo. STAT. § 35-502.12(c) (i)
(Supp. 1975).
45. Wyo. STAT. § 35-502.24(b) (viii) (Supp. 1975).
46. WYO. STAT. § 35-502.24(b) (xii) (Supp. 1975).
47. WYo. STAT. § 35-502.24(b) (xii) (c) (Supp. 1975).
48. Wyo. STAT. § 35-502.24(b) (x)-(xii) (Supp. 1975) (originally enacted as
ch. 198, § 2 [1975] Wyo. Sess. Laws 408-409).
49. The discriminatory effect upon those surface owners qualifying for a
complete veto and those only having a partial veto was apparently accepted
by the legislature and electorate alike. One legislator, however, did warn
of future litigation as the law "amounted to 'giving one person [the residential or agricultural surface owner] the property of another [the mineral
estate owner] without due process of law' ". Wyoming State Tribune,
March 13, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
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sent,5" the same applicant apparently has no such recourse,
surface owner is a "residential or agricultural landwhen the
'
51
owner.
The applicant must arrange notice by publication in the
locality of the mining site." After a four-week notice period
and an additional comment period, the Director upon recommendation by the Administrator may issue the mining
permit. If during the notice and comment period, an application produces an objection by "any interested person,"2 " the
application is removed to the Council for hearing and adjudication. 4 Judicial review is available in district court.5
If the Administrator denies the mining permit, the applicant is entitled to a hearing before the Council.56 The
standards in the act appear to give the Administrator and the
Council broad discretion to deny a mining permit. 7
If the permit issues, it covers the applicable tract through
the reclamation stage to termination of the mining operation.
The WEQ contains no "due diligence" criteria, but the mining
permit may be revoked upon a showing that the permit holder willfully misstated or failed to disclose any fact which
would have led to denial of permit. 8
Before any mining can proceed, an operator must obtain
a license to mine. 9 The application for the license must be
filed with the Administrator by the mining operator. The apApparently, the conditions
50. WYO. STAT. § 35-302.24(b) (x) (Supp. 1975).
which the Council must find to issue an order in lieu of consent are those
presently found under section 35-502.24(b) (xii) (A)-(D) of the Wyoming Statutes. Those conditions are identical to the ones that had to be
found by the Council in the analogous pre-1975 amendment section, now
basically codified as § 35-502.24(b) (x). See the Environmental Quality
Act, ch. 250, § 1, art. 4 [1973] Wyo. Sess. Law 634 (amended by Wyo. Stat.
(Supp. 1975).
§ 35-502.24(b)(x)-(xii)
51. Compare WYo. STAT. 35-502.24(b) (xi) (Supp. 1975) wiLh Wyo. STAT. §
35-502.24(b) (xii) (Supp. 1975)).
52. Wyo. STAT. § 35.502.24(e) (Supp. 1975).
53. The statute contains no definition of "any interested person."
54. WYO. STAT. § 35.502.24(f) (Supp. 1975); Wyo. Stat. § 35-502.12(a)(iv)
(Supp. 1975).
55. Wyo. STAT. § 35-502.24.(f) (Supp. 1975).
56. WYO. STAT. § 35-502.12 (a) (iv) (Supp. 1975).
57. WYo. STAT. § 35-502.24(g) (Supp. 1975).
58. WYO. STAT. § 35-502.26(a) (Supp. 1975).
59. Wyo. STAT. § 35-502.27 (Supp. 1975).
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plication must include a copy of the mining permit, written
consent of the permit holder, and a mining and reclamation
plan for the first year of operation. 0 A denial of a license
may be reversed by the Council or in turn by the state courts. 1
From cost estimates provided by the mining operator, the Administrator fixes the amount of the performance bond. The
bond is executed by the mine operator to secure compliance
with the WEQ, mining permits, licenses, and reclamation
plans issued under it.6" When deemed necessary by the
Land Quality Advisory Board, the minerals owner may be
joined as a principal." "Any violation of this Act" will support forfeiture proceedings brought by the Attorney General
if recommended by the Director, with the Council's approv4
al.
The Division of Land Quality exercises oversight of the
mining operations through an annual review. The review is
triggered by the operator's annual report, which indicates the
progress of mining and reclamation that year. It highlights
any deviations from the license application and previous
mining and reclamation plans. It must contain the mining
and reclamation plan for the ensuing year, complete with
cost estimates. After inspection of the site, the Administrator may approve the report and the Director determines the
amount of the bond for the next year."5
The operator must disclose any fact coming to his attention, the disclosure of which would have resulted in denial
of the mining permit, whether or not the fact may have existed at the time of the application.
The failure to disclose
may result in revocation of the license. Further, the license
may be suspended upon substantial violation of either the
60. WYO. STAT. § 35-502.27 (Supp. 1975).
61. Wyo. STAT. § 35-502.12(c) (Supp. 1975); WYO. STAT. § 35-502.12(f) (Supp.
1975). The provision guarantees the license applicant judicial review as
provided by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.
62. The operator's statutory duties can be found at Wyo. STAT. § 35-502.32
(Supp. 1975).
63. WYO. STAT. § 35-502.34(b) (Supp. 1975).
64. WYO. STAT. § 35-502.38(a) (Supp. 1975).
65. Wyo. STAT. § 35-502.28(d) (Supp. 1975).
66. WYO. STAT. § 35-502.29(a) (i) (Supp. 1975).
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WEQ or non-compliance with the terms of the permit or
license."
A prominent feature in the WEQ is its protection of the
interest of the surface owner. First, the surface owner
might veto the mining permit, if mining would substantially
prohibit his operations." Second, when the mining permittee
is other than the surface owner, he must execute a bond or
an undertaking to the state for the benefit of the surface
owner to pay damages to the surface estate." Third, damages recoverable include damage to crops, forage, improvements, and financial loss from disturbance of the surface."
The damages so recovered "shall be commensurate with the
reasonable value of the surrounding land . . ."" The Administrator determines the amount of the bond or undertaking. Damages are recoverable as they accrue and must be
paid annually or as agreed between the parties.72 Further,
holders of water rights are given a right of action for damages due to pollution of surface or groundwater. 3
The second prominent feature is that the WEQ leaves
open reclamation to uses other than that to which the land
was put prior to mining." While such latitude should be considered a significant concession to the industry," the proposed
new uses made possible by reclamation are subject to rather
broad administrative discretion.
Third, WE Q attempts to steer clear of the taking issue,
-by inserting a Jekyll and Hyde provision: If a mineral owner
is disappointed by denial, revocation, or suspension of right
to exploit the mineral estate because an area has been des67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.
75.

(Supp. 1975).
(Supp. 1975).
WYO. STAT. § 35-502.33(a) (Supp. 1975).
WYO. STAT. § 35-502.33(a) (Supp. 1975).
(Supp. 1975).
WYO. STAT. § 35-502.33(a)
WYO. STAT. § 35-502.33(a) (Supp. 1975).
Wyo. STAT. § 35-502.33(b) (Supp. 1975).
WYO. STAT. § 35-502.21(a) (Supp. 1975).
Revegetation of land to sagebrush and prairie grasses, dependent on restoration of delicate soils, may not be possible within acceptable time frames.
Legislation which would insist on strict restoration would likely render
significant coal reserves inaccessible. See, generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, REHIBILITATION POTENTIAL OF WESTERN COAL LANDS, supra note
WYO.

STAT.

§ 35-502.29(b)

WYO. STAT. § 35-502.24(b)(xii)(c)

22.
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ignated a unique area, the disappointed permittee or licensee
may claim in district court that the state has taken property
without compensation. 76 However, when the lands subject
to regulation are private or state lands held under patents
subject to federal mineral reservations, beneath the taking
issue broods a second problem which complicates resolution
of the first.
Providing compensation may not save state strip mining
legislation held to be a taking of the mineral interests, even if
the coal reserved to the United States subsequently has been
disposed by lease or otherwise to private parties. In Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,7 TPC argued
inter alia that it could invoke condemnation powers under
Title 15 U.S.C. to deprive Kerr-McGee of its interest in potash
deposits underlying its pipeline compressor station. The
Court over a strong dissent by Judge Doyle held that TPC
could not exercise eminent domain powers against the government. Since Kerr-McGee was a licensee of the government
and since condemnation of the mineral interest would necessarily deprive the government of royalties, TPC's claim was
a thinly veiled assault on the title of the sovereign." The
Transwestern Pipeline case suggests that if Wyoming's surface mining legislation, or orders, ordinances, rules, and regulations under it, were held to be a taking, then compensation
would not save it, when the land involved was underlain by
federal coal or coal under federal lease. Since much of the
mineral wealth, coal in particular, is either owned outright
by the United States or held under leases from the United
States, there is some doubt that eminent domain could lie
against those interests.
Finally, the WEQ puts great emphasis on private enforcement of its objectives. "Any interested person" raising an objection to a permit application removes the application to full blown hearing before the council. 9 Further, any
aggrieved party under the WEQ may gain review of any
STAT. § 35-502.51 (Supp. 1975).
77. 492 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. diamissed, 419 U.S. 1097 (1975).
78. Id. at 883.
79. WYO. STAT. § 35-502.24(f) (Supp. 1975).

76. WYo.
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final order or administration action in district court under
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.8"
Land Use Planning in Wyoming
Land use planning is in its infancy in Wyoming. The
report of the Wyoming Conservation and Land Use Study
Commission (CLUSC) revealed that fewer than half of the
cities in the state are involved in city planning and fewer
still have any zoning ordinance. 1 In 10 of the 23 counties
responding to its survey, zoning ordinances or master plans
are in effect.8" Campbell County, the cradle of Wyoming's
surface coal mining industry, established a county Planning
Commission in 1969." 8 Some of the unincorporated land is
zoned. While no zoning ordinance is currently being devised,
its master plan is in revision.84 Only three counties have put
into effect zoning or master plans countywide.85
Since statehood in 1890, agriculture has dominated the
Wyoming economy. Wyoming's inhabitants have grown
accustomed to its wide open spaces and its abundant natural
beauty. Theirs has been an unhurried pace of life, placing
few demands on the public sector.8" But things are changing
in Wyoming. The worldwide resource shortages of the 1970's
are bringing intense pressure for economic development of
Wyoming's abundant natural wealth. There is growing
recognition that the state must find new paths to gain a
measure of control over burgeoning industrial activity. The
urgency of the problem as perceived by the Wyoming legislature is revealed in the Wyoming Community Development
Authority Act:
80. Wyo. STAT. § 35-502.51 (Supp. 1975).
81. See Table 1 of WYOMING CONSERVATION

AND LAND USE STUDY COMMISSION,

1 STATEWIDE LAND USE PLANNING PROGRAM FOR WYOMING 10-12 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as LAND USE STUDY].
82. Table 2, Id. at 13.
83. Id.

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Indicative of the rugged individualism of its citizens is a footnote to Table
2 of the Land Use Study Commission's Report, explaining why no zoning
ordinance was under consideration in Weston Count. "A hearing on zoning
was held in 1964, but there was so much opposition that it was tabled, and
a plan was never drawn up." Id. at 13.
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§ 9-827. Statement of legislative findings and purposes. It is hereby declared that there exists in this
state by reason of the location and expansion of mineral extractive industries and other industrial developments, an acute shortage of adequate municipal, educational, recreational, cultural and other
community facilities, and public services and municipally owned utilities, which conditions threaten and
adversely affect the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people of this state. 7
Further there is a growing recognition that land use
planning is the 'appropriate tool to manage the "mounting
crisis":

The considerable attention given to protecting the
quality of our air and water has often failed to
grasp the relationship of those qualities to the predominant land use patterns .... In some areas of our
state the problems are already in evidence-unguided sprawl of mobile homes; roads, houses and
other buildings being located on unstable lands and
floodplains; highways located in areas periodically
or seasonally subject to high winds; urban and industrial encroachment on lands more properly suited
for agricultural or other uses."
DEVELOPMENT OF LAND USE PLANNING IN WYOMING

From statehood in 1890, Wyoming State Legislature
asserted its police power in what could be described as land
use regulation. Until very recent times this regulation involved the use of public lands. 9 Limited zoning authority
was delegated to incorporated cities and towns in 1923,90
and board authority for land use planning in incorporated
cities and towns came in 1961. 1' Counties obtained limited
land use planning authority in 1955, when the legislature
87. WYO. STAT. § 9-827 (Supp. 1975).
88. LAND USE STUDY, supra note 68, at 1.

89. See Public Lands (Title 36), Water (Title 41), Townsites and Public
lands (Title 15.1) and Eminent Domain (Title 1 ch. 27) of the Wyoming
Statutes.
90. WYO. STAT. 15.1-83 et. seq. (1965).
91. Wyo. STAT. §§ 15.1-71 to 15.1-82 (1965).
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permitted establishment of sanitation districts in unincorporated areas." The basic legislation delegating to the
counties power to regulate the land use countywide was
passed in 1959.11
The statute vests in a Board of County Commissioners
authority
In order to promote the public health, safety, morals
and general welfare ... to regulate and to restrict

the... use, condition of use or occupancy of lands
for residence, recreation, agriculture, industry, commerce, public use and other purposes in the unincorporated area of the county."
Further, counties specifically were denied zoning authority
over the mineral extractive industries. Section 18-289.1
continues
It is provided, however, that.., no zoning resolution or plan shall prevent any use or occupancy reasonably necessary to the extraction or production
of the mineral resources in or under any land subject thereto."
A perceivable trend toward comprehensive land use
control began in the late 1960's with the creation of the Interdepartmental Water Conference and the enabling of the
Wyoming Water Planning Program in 1967, the Open Cut
Mined Land Reclamation Act of 1969, and the Environmental
Quality Act of 1973.
THE WORK OF THE LAND USE STUDY COMMISSION

In 1973, the Wyoming State Legislature established
the Wyoming Conservation and Land Use Study Commission,
92. Wyo. STAT. § 18-281 to 18-289 (1957).
93. WYO. STAT. §§ 18-289.1 to 18-289.9 (Supp. 1975).
94. WYO. STAT. § 18-289.1 (Supp. 1975).
95. WYo. STAT. § 18-289.1 (Supp. 1975). That is not to say that all power
with respect to the extractive industries reposes in the state and not the
counties. Section 1-743 of the Wyoming Statutes grants eminent domain
powers to the counties. Furthermore, considerable control can be asserted
through county government influence on the location, quality, and timing
of essential utility services. See Schlauch, Tripartite Federalisms-The
Emerging Role of Local Government as a Regulator of the Extraectivse
Industries, 20 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INsT. 869 (1975).
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charged with designing a comprehensive "program of land
use planning which would help to insure quality of life and
order in growth and development in Wyoming."'" The program recommended contained three themes. First, land use
regulations should be implemented with coordination among
federal, state, county, city, and special municipalities. Second, following the thrust of the various forms of federal land
use legislation, much of the land use power reposes at the
state and not the local level. Third, some modification of
the market value system of real property taxation should be
developed, because that system discourages agricultural uses
and rehabilitation of exploited lands.
The commission proposed legislation which would set
up an administrative agency to oversee statewide land use
planning. It would have required governing bodies to adopt
comprehensive land use plans "not inconsistent with federal
or state guidelines or laws."'" The proposals would amend
Section 18-289.1 of the Wyoming Statutes providing for comprehensive planning with respect to the minerals industries."s
WYOMING LAND USE PLANNING ACT OF 1975

The Land Use Study Commission proposed four bills to
implement its conclusions." Three of the four have failed to
pass the Legislature as of this writing. For the most part,
these can be regarded as housekeeping legislation or cumulative to the Wyoming Land Use Planning Act of 1975 (hereafter referred to as "the 1975 Act").100
Much of the proposed legislation did pass in the 1975
Act. 1 ' The 1975 Act sets up a comprehensive planning
mechanism. It requires all cities and counties to develop
96. LAND USE STUDY, supra note 68, at 3.

97. See ch. IV, art. III, § 1(a).

Id. at A-17.

98. Id. at C-1 through 2.

99. See ch. IV. Id.

100. The proposed amendment to Section 18-289.1 would have given local governing bodies planning responsibility for mining.

This authority would be

subject to strict oversight at the state level under the 1975 Act to the extent

such mining operations become "areas of critical or more than local concern." WYO. STAT. § 9-853(a) (ix) (Supp. 1975).

101. Wyoming Land Use Planning Act of 1975, WYO. STAT. §§ 9-849 to 9-862
(Supp. 1975).
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land use plans consistent with statewide goals, policies, and
guidelines set at the state level."0 2 The act provides the local
government Land Use Planning Grants out of the general
fund.' °
The heart of the 1975 Act is Section 9-852 which establishes a State Land Use Planning Commission with rulemaking authority. The act gives the commission power
(ii) To adopt, modify, enforce or revise rules and
regulations necessary for the implementation of the
purposes and provisions of this act...."'
While the 1975 Act appears to lack any broad substantive
mandate, 05 the commission is empowered to promulgate
statewide land use planning goals "in accordance with the
best interests of the state, counties, cities, towns and regions."'0 6 The statewide land use plan integrates local land
use plans which meet its approval. 107
The commission is empowered to establish its own developmental guidelines in the first instance for these areas
identified to be of "critical or more than local concern" and
to exercise greater oversight in the development of local land
use plans in those areas.'
The legislature expressed a clear intent to exercise its
police power free from federal interference. The commission
was empowered
(xii) To cooperate with federal agencies and with
other states, provided that such cooperation is performed in such a manner as to assure that no federal
Wvo. STAT. § 9-856 (Supp. 1975).
WYO. STAT. § 9-862(c) (Supp. 1975).
Wyo. STAT. § 9-853(a) (ii) (Supp. 1975).
The preamble contains no statement of policy. The bill proposed by CLUSC
contained an extensive statement of policy but it was excised from the version finally enacted. See ch. IV, LAND USa SiUny, at A-2 through 3.
106. WYo. STAT. § 9-853 (a) (vi) (Supp. 1975).
107. WYo. STAT. § 9-853 (a) (vii), 9-856 (Supp. 1975).
"Areas of critical
(xiv) (Supp. 1975).
108. WYO. STAT. §9-853(a) (ix)-(x),
or more than local concern" are those "where uncontrolled or incompatible
large scale development could result in damage to the environment, life
or property, where the short or long term public interest is of more than
local significance". WYo. STAT. § 9-850(b) (Supp. 1975).
102.
103.
104.
105.
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intervention or control shall take place in the initial
or continuing state or local land use planning process .... 10
In enacting that language, the legislature departed significantly from CLUSC recommendations to coordinate state and
local land use plans with those of federal land management
agencies. The provision parallel to Section 9-850 (a) (xii) of
the Wyoming Statutes in the bill proposed by CLUSC read as
follows:
The commission shall have the following powers and
duties:
(n) To cooperate and coordinate with federal
agencies, other states and any interstate land use
planning agency or body and enter into interstate
agreements or compacts with adjacent states.11
The intent of the legislature to remain independent of
federal involvement in its land use regulation is further
evidenced by a second departure from the proposed legislation.
In Article 1, Section 2, the proposed bill read as follows:
2. Policy. It is the finding of the legislature that
the welfare of the people of Wyoming requires a
more orderly development of the state's resources;
various governmental levels must therefore actively
engage in the [formulation of land use policy] ....
In addition, since much of the land within the state
is federally owned, policies governing the use of
Wyoming's land resources would be beneficial where
federal land use and management decisions could
have significant impact on statewide or local environment and development.111
In the comments to the policy statement in the proposed
bill the CLUSC argued:
Proliferating transportation systems, largescale industrial and economic growth, conflicts in emerging patterns of land use, the fragmentation of gov109. WYO. STAT. § 9-850(a) (xii) (Supp. 1975).
110. See ch. IV art. I § 2(n), LAND UsE STuDY at A-12.
111. Id.
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ernmental entities exercising land use planning powers, and the increased size, scale and impact of private actions have created a situation in which land
use management decisions of national,regional and
statewide concern are being made on the basis of expediency, tradition, and short-term economic considerations and other factors which are often unrelated to the real concerns of a sound land use policy
A state land use policy should be formulated
....
an
expression of the needs and interests of
upon
state, regional, and local governments as well as
those of the federalgovernment.2 [Emphasis Added]
The legislature would have none of the spirit of integration of national needs with its own concerns. Instead,
the act contains a clear directive to the commission: it is to
cooperate with the federal land management agencies, but
it is not to permit "intervention" in the land use planning
process. A clearer intent to exercise its police power would
be hard to draft.
III.

THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE:

A

LIMIT TO STATE

CONTROL OVER SURFACE MINING OF FEDERAL COAL

State Police Power and the Public Lands: The Historical
Setting
In determining authority to regulate the public lands,
two competing principles emerge. First, article IV, section
3, clause 2, of the United States Constitution gives the Congress power to regulate, control, and dispose of the public
lands. " ' This power may not be abrogated by the states. " 4
Second, upon achieving statehood each state acquires sovereign powers over the public lands. 1 5
An accommodation between these principles was reached
in terms of the supremacy clause. In Omaechevarria v.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Federal Power Comm'n v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 1T, 21 (1952).
Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., supra note 77.
Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885); Macomber v. Bose,
401 F.2d 545, 546 (9th Cir. 1968).
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State of Idaho,"' the Supreme Court denied a challenge to a
state statute regulating the common use of national forest
land by cattlemen and sheepmen. The Court through Mr.
Justice Brandeis pointed to the absence of any right of any
citizen to access to forest reserves. The cattlemen and sheepmen alike were no more than tenants at sufferance on the
forest reserves. But the Court suggested that the supremacy
clause might work a different result if the Idaho legislature
had attempted to exercise federal plenary powers. The Court
held that reasonable exercise of the police power "extends
over the Federal public domain, at least, when there is no
legislation by Congress on the subject.""...
Despite the limiting facts of the Greek's case, the
principle that states' police power extends to the public lands
so far as it is consistent with acts of Congress gained wide acceptance. In McKelvey v. United States" the defendants,
convicted of obstructing the access of sheepmen to open range,
challenged the federal statute as an unconstitutional intrusion on the state police power. In rejecting the claim, the
court gave its imprimatur to a rule of coexistence of sovereignty of the states and the United States on public lands.
It is firmly settled that Congress may prescribe rules
respecting the use of the public lands. It may sanction some uses and prohibit others, and may forbid
interference with such as are sanctioned [citations
omitted].... It also is settled that the States may
prescribe police regulations applicable to public land
areas, so long as the regulations are not arbitrary or
inconsistent with applicable congressional enactments. '
In Allen v. Bailey,"' the plaintiffs, cattlemen grazing
their herds on the open range, brought suit against sheepmen
116.
117.
118.
119.

246 U.S. 343 (1918) (the Greek's case).
Id. at 346.
260 U.S. 353 (1922).
Id. at 359. In accord Hatahley v. United States, 220 F.2d 666 (10th Cir.
1955), rev'd other grounds 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
120. 91 Colo. 260, 14 P.2d 1087 (1932). The most recent enunciation of the rule
is in State ex rel. Andrus v. Click, 554 P.2d 969 (Idaho 1976), which enforced Idaho's dredge mining permit and reclamation standards against
unpatented mining claims on National Forest land.
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under a state law granting power to state courts to apportion
the use of the range between cattle and sheep interests. Four
sheepmen appealed from the trial court's apportionment
order, asserting their right to occupy and use the public
land conferred by Section 1063 of Title 43 of the United
States Code. The Court recognized the plenary power of
Congress to control the public lands, and it recognized the
federal possessory rights of the sheepmen as implied licensees of the United States. Nevertheless the Court upheld the
statute, stating what it ascertained to be settled general law:
Congress is vested by the constitution with the power
to control and to make all needful rules and regulations with respect to the public domain, and the exercise of such power cannot be restricted by state
legislation. But the states may also prescribe reasonable police regulations applicable to public land
areas, in so far as such regulations do not conflict
with congressional enactment or if the congress has
not acted.'21
The extent to which Congress must act under the supremacy clause to displace the police power was probed in
Texas Oil and Gas Corp. v. PhillipsPetroleum Co.12 Oil and
gas lessees on federal land sought to nullify state compulsory
oil field unitization regulations. The parties conceded that
under the rule of State of Colorado v. Toll,' compulsory unitization was within the police power and that the regulations
were properly applicable to oil fields on federal lands, unless
Congress has expressed an intent to exclude the states from
the field. The issue was whether the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920 expressed that intent. The trial court found nothing
in the act or the regulations thereunder which would exclude
the states from regulating oil production on public lands.2
The Court of Appeals agreed that the extant federal regulation governing oil production on public land could not be
regarded as inconsistent with the state regulations. It held
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 1091.
406 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 396 U.S. 829 (1969).
268 U.S. 228 (1925).
Texas Oil and Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 277 F. Supp. 366 (W.D.
Okla. 1967).
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further that no case for federal preemption existed, since the
state regulations worked no impermissible interference with
the interests of the United States.12
These cases suggest inquiry into two constitutional limits
to the states' police power on the public lands. First, any
state land use regulation aimed at controlling surface mining
must pass muster under the fourteenth amendment as a
reasonable exercise of the police power and not an unconstitutional taking. This taking question is beyond the reach of this
article and has been treated exhaustively elsewhere.2
Second, state regulation is precluded to the extent that the states
delegated the power to regulate the subject matter to the
United States and to the extent the legislation is preempted
by acts of Congress.
The Preemption Doctrine
The preemption doctrine gives effect to the constitutional division of power between the federal government and
the states. Its heritage runs to Gibbons v. Ogden1' and
Cooley v. Board of Wardens.' The preemption doctrine now
-as always perhaps-serves as a fairly unprincipled vehicle
for expressing the Supreme Court's notions of federalism.
It has become the touchstone of the concept of "cooperative
federalism" evolving in the Burger Court.'29
The preemption doctrine permits courts to invalidate
state legislation which stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.3 °
The preemption doctrine has been invoked when state legislation conflicts with federal legislation or when the state intrudes into a regulatory field determined to be the exclusive
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Texas Oil and Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra, note 122, at 1305306.
See BOSSELMAN, COLLIES AND BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS oF LAND USE CONTROL (A report Prepared
for the Council on Environmental Quality) (1973).
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
See Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism
and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975).
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941).
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province of the Congress. The Court has been less than consistent in putting content into the preemption doctrine as
rendered by Hines v. Davidowitz. 3 '
THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE

THE PRE-BURGER COURT EVOLUTION

Before 1973, the preemption doctrine had evolved into a
presumption of federal supremacy. In the 1941 case of
Hines the Court departed from earlier cases which required
clear congressional intent to clear the states from the regulatory field or actual conflict with federal legislation. Finding
special preemptive capability in federal legislation emanating
from national sovereign powers over foreign affairs, the
Court held federal alien registration legislation to preempt
similar state legislation despite the absence of conflict or express congressional intent to occupy the regulatory field. The
Hines approach soon pervaded both the occupation and the
conflict grounds for preemption. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,3 ' the requirement that Congress express its
intent to displace the states from a regulatory field evaporated, signaling a solicitude for federal interests outside the
field of foreign affairs. In Rice, the Court inferred such intent from the pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme, the
dominance of the federal interests, and inconsistency of results under state regime with federal statutory objectives.
In Pennsylvania v. Nelson,' the Court held a federal sedition law to preempt a Pennsylvania sedition statute on the
ground that concurrent regulation by the two sovereignties
created the mere risk of conflict. The balancing of state
and federal interests had thus ossified into a broad-based
presumption of federal supremacy.
131. Indeed, Hines in its 35 years has demonstrated a remarkable chameleonlike quality, at home with the Supreme Courts deference to federal supremacy (see, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968)), and with the Burger Court's deference to
state interests (see, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973)
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)).
132. Supra note 131.
133. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM:
BURGER COURT'S DEFERENCE TO STATE INTERESTS

Since Hines the Court had been suggesting that, if the
Congress does not want to displace state regulation of the
same subject matter, they should be clear about the intention.
In the October term, 1972, the Supreme Court handed down
a number of decisions calculated to recast the preemption
doctrine in a form better suited to Burger Court concepts of
The Burger Court was suggesting a reversal
federalism.'
of presumptions. The Court seemed to be saying that if Congress desires to displace State regulation of the same subject matter, they should be clear about that intention. Although these decisions did not involve public lands, they are
instructive from an analytical standpoint for federal preemption in the field of surface coal mining.
In Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 3 '
ship owners and operators, as well as owners and operators of
oil terminal facilities located in Florida, brought suit to enjoin
enforcement of the Florida Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution
Control Act on the ground that the regulatory field had been
preempted by federal legislation. The Florida Act held each
owner or operator of a terminal facility and ship owners
strictly liable for damage incurred by either the state or private persons as a result of oil spills. The federal act imposed on ship owners strict liability up to $14,000,000, and
on owners of terminal facilities up to $8,000,000 for costs
of the federal government in cleaning up oil spills. Mr. Justice Douglas for the Court examined the two acts. The federal act was not a comprehensive regulatory effort. The
statutory language expressed no intent to preempt state legislation, but instead evidenced a plan of cooperation with the
states."' The Court concluded that the state was within its
134. See generally, City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S.
624. (1973); Goldstein v. California, supra note 131; Lake Carriers Assn. v.
MacMullan, 416 U.S. 498 (1972); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) ; New York State Dept. of Social Services
v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257
(1973).
135. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
136. Id. at 329-30.
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constitutional authority in creating a cause of action for
either the state or private individuals to recoup their losses
from oil spills."3 '
In Goldstein v. California, the Court examined concurrent regulation in the patents and copyright field. The petitioners in Goldstein were convicted under state law of piracy
of musical recordings. They sought to set aside the conviction on the ground that the states had reserved no power to
regulate under the copyright clause of the federal Constitution or in the alternative that if the states did reserve such
power, the California regulatory scheme was preempted by
federal copyright legislation. The Court held that the states
reserved power to regulate in the field, since the grant in
article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution did not
grant the power exclusively to the United States nor expressly
deny it to the states. Further, the Court declined to imply
such exclusivity in the absence of a showing that concurrent regulation by both the federal and state governments
would necessarily or inevitably lead to difficulty. 8 '
Having determined that California had residual power
to regulate in the copyright field, the Court next determined
whether or not the state legislation should be invalidated
under the supremacy clause. The object of the Court's inquiry was whether the state law stood as an obstacle to the
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. In
the federal legislation, the Court could find no clear and unambiguous intent to exclude the states from the regulatory
field. The Court could find no actual conflict and refused to
preempt the state legislation on the occupation ground when
Congress, the courts, federal agencies, and the states had
consistently worked in a scheme of coexistence of federal
copyright legislation and state trade regulation. The dissenters in Goldstein had trouble reconciling what appeared to
them to be a clear conflict between the federal and state regulatory schemes. Mr. Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun and Brennan joined, wrote:
137. Id. at 344.
138. Goldstein v. California, supra note 131, at 554-55.
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California's law promotes monopoly; the federal
policy promotes monopoly only when a copyright is
issued and it fosters competition in all other instances. Moreover, federal law limits its monopoly
to 28 years plus a like renewal period, while California extends her monopoly into perpetuity." 9
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Ware,1 4 an account executive with Merrill Lynch, voluntarily
terminated his employment and entered competitive employment contrary to the terms of his employment contract with
Merrill Lynch. Ware brought an action in state court to
recover his interest in the employees' profit-sharing plan, and
Merrill Lynch sought to dismiss on the ground that his interest in the plan had been forfeited for violation of conditions
of employment. Ware's employment with Merrill Lynch
had been subject both to approval by the New York Stock Exchange and to a pledge by Ware to abide by Exchange rules
requiring compulsory arbitration of disputes arising out of
the termination of employment. California law regarded
the dispute as one over wages, giving Ware a right of action
despite private agreement to submit such disputes to arbitration.
The Supreme Court was thus presented the problem of
attaching meaning under the supremacy clause to what appeared on its face, a clear, irreconcilable conflict between
state law and valid rules of the New York Stock Exchange.
The Court drew a distinction between rules which carry preemptive capability and those which do not:
It is thus clear that the congressional aim in supervised self regulation is to insure fair dealing and to
protect investors from harmful or unfair trading
practices. To the extent that any exchange rule or
practice contravenes this policy, or any authorized
rule or regulation under the Act, the rule may be
subject to appropriate federal regulatory supervision or action. Correspondingly, any rule or practice
not germane to fair dealing or investor protection
139. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas.
140. Supra note 134.
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would not appear to fall under the shadow of the
federal umbrella; it is instead, subject to applicable
state law.1"1
Since the compulsory arbitration rule was not at the heart
of the regulatory scheme and since there appeared to be no
compelling need for uniformity, the Court could not find
sufficient interference with the federal regulatory scheme
to justify overriding California's strong policy to protect
wage earners from compulsory arbitration agreements.
In New York State Department of Social Services v.
Dublino, the Court reversed a three-judge United States
District Court for the Western District of New York, which
held that the federal work incentive program (WIN) contained in the 1967 amendment to the Social Security Act preempted the New York work rules of the New York social welfare law. The Court observed that welfare is a field or regulation in which both states and the Federal government
pursue powerful interests in a coordinated and complementary administrative fabric.14 In such a context, the Court
would impose a heavy burden of persuasion on those urging
preemption.'43 The Court could perceive no necessary conflict as in Rosado v. Wyman'44 and Townsend v. Swank, 4 '
both cases in which state law defined "need" and "dependent
child" for restricted entitlements under the AFDC program.
In the absence of such conflict, the Court relying on Schwartz
v. Texas,' looked for evidence showing a "clear manifestation of [congressional] intent" that "must exist before a federal statute is held to 'supercede the exercise' of state action. 1.. In the absence of such "clear manifestation," the
Court refused to infer a Congressional intent to occupy the
field.
141. Id. at 130-131.
142. New York State Dep't of Social Services v. Dublino, supra note 134, at
412 ot. seq.
143. Id. at 415-417.
144. 397 U.S. 397.
145. 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
146. 344 U.S. 199, 202-203 (1952).
147. New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino, supra note 134,
at 417.
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In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., as
in Dublino, petitioners sought to invalidate state legislation
in an area in which the Congress had legislated against a rich
tradition of federal interest. However, the regulatory field
in issue did not fit the pattern of cooperative federalism.
First, the United States operates in its sovereign capacity
over air space. Second, the Federal Aviation Administration
enjoys broad discretion to implement it. Finally, the subject
matter itself was peculiarly dependent upon uniform regulation.
In Burbank, the owner and operator of the airport and an
interstate air carrier brought suit in federal court for a declaratory judgment that a city curfew ordinance prohibiting
takeoff by jet aircraft between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and
7:00 a.m. was invalid. The Court noted the trial court's
finding that the Burbank curfew necessitated "bunching"
of air traffic and resulted in increased congestion, noise, and
inefficiencies in traffic management. As such, the noise ordinance was ".... totally inconsistent with the objectives of
The Court
the federal statutory and regulatory scheme." ' 1'
relied on Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., inferring a Congressional intent to preempt the states from the pervasiveness
of the federal regulatory scheme, the dominance of the federal interests, and the inconsistent objectives of the FAA
and the City of Burbank.
In the October term, 1973, the Supreme Court continued
to hand down preemption decisions.149 The Bicron case is
noteworthy because it suggests an emerging analytical pattern for Burger Court renderings of the preemption doctrine.
In Bicron, employees of Harshaw Chemical Company, an
unincorporated subsidiary of Kewanee Oil Company, terminated their employment and formed Bicron Corporation.
They took with them an unpatented but patentable technology
for synthesizing crystals used to detect ionizing radiation.
Harshaw Chemical Company and Kewanee Oil Company
148. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, supra note 134, at 627-29.
149. Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Mahon v.
Stowers, 416 U.S. 100 (1974); Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
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considered the technology to be a trade secret under Ohio law.
Kewanee brought a diversity action in U.S. District Court
for damages and an injunction for the misappropriation of
the technology. Bicron defended on the strength of Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, ' ° contending that the Ohio trade
secret law blocked from the public domain new technology
which under federal patent law belonged in the public domain.
Bicron contended that the Ohio Trade Secrets law, in irreconcilable conflict with federal patent law, should be preempted.
The District Court rejected the preemption defense and
granted the injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed. The
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, corrected its
erroneous reading of the Stiffel case, and reinstated the injunction of the District Court.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, relied
on Goldstein v. Californiafor the proposition that the state
retained some sovereignty in the trade secrets regulatory
area. That left the supremacy clause as the remaining
limit. Since federal legislation did not expressly clear the
states from the regulatory field, the Court saw its job to
determine whether "the scheme of protection developed by
Ohio respecting trade secrets 'clashes with the objectives
of the federal patent laws'.""' A parallel analysis of the
two regulatory schemes revealed a partial conflict. The
Court viewed the objective of the patent laws to be one of
tolerating limited monopoly over patentable inventions while
encouraging free flow of technology into the public domain
with respect to nonpatentables. The Ohio trade secrets law
amounted to a grant of monopoly in perpetuity over trade
secrets, without regard to their patentability under federal
law. The Court conceded that applying state trade secret
protection to unpatentable technologies would present a case
of partial conflict, but "the extension of trade secret protection to clearly patentable inventions does not conflict with
the patent policy of disclosure."'1 2 Despite the conceded
partial conflict, the Court declined the opportunity to in150. Supra note 131.
151. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., aupra note 149 at 480 quoting Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, supra note 131, at 231.
152. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., supra note 149, at 491.
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voke partial preemption with respect to trade secret protection for technologies not clearly patentable because it
would impose difficult administrative burdens on state courts
tasked to determine federal patent law. Accordingly, the
Court found "[n]either complete nor partial preemption of
state trade secret law is justified."' 8
The decision of the Burger Court yields this learning.
State legislation may be constitutionally repugnant when it
has exercised a power granted exclusively to the United States.
Such exclusivity may be implied, when concurrent legislation necessarily or inevitably would lead to difficulty. Further, state legislation may be preempted when and to the
extent that it presents an obstacle to the full accomplishment
of the purposes of Congress. State legislation becomes such
an obstacle, first, when state legislation conflicts with federal
legislation or federal regulations within the "federal umbrella"; and second, when to Congress may be attributed a
"clear and manifest" intention to exclude the states from the
regulatory field.
The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and Existing Interior Department Regulations
The power of Congress over the public lands ceases when
in its entirety it is disposed of by patent.'54 The statutory
structure suggests that issue of the patent works the terminus of the interest of the Secretary of the Interior in the
land. 55 After the surface patent issues, the federal government retains the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the
coal under the disposal provisions of the coal lands laws
under Section 85 of Title 30 of the United States Code. Disposal of such coal is governed by the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920.156 That act expressly provides that "[n]othing in this
chapter shall be construed or held to affect the rights of the
states or other local authority to exercise any rights which
153. Id. at 492.
154. Winona & St. Peter R.R. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618 (1885).
155. See 43 U.S.C. § 329 (1970); of. Reed v. Morton, 480 F.2d 634, cert. den.,
414 U.S. 1069 (1973).
156. 41 Stat. 437 (1920), 30 U.S.C. § 181 et. seq. (1970).
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they might have . .. "I" Those rights have been held to include the police power, unless its exercise is inconsistent
with acts of Congress."'8
The Texas Oil and Gas Corp. decision leaves open the
argument that state surface mining legislation is protected
under Section 189 of Title 30 of the United States Code only
to the extent that federal residual powers to dispose of the
reserved coal have not been exercised in such a manner as to
manifest an interest to deal exclusively with the subject.
Until the Secretary promulgated the 1976 coal resource management regulations, 5 ' federal coal lands disposal regulations expressed a fairly clear intent to leave to the states the
land use regulation of coal lands privately owned but held subject to federal mineral reservations.
A broad statement of disposal policy, left intact by the
new coal leasing and operating regulations, expresses an intent to encourage state and local land use regulations:
§ 1725.2 Disposal Policy. Public lands will be transferred out of federal ownership in the most efficient
manner possible. This will be accomplished, where
practicable, by the following procedures.
(a) Encouragement and assistance will be expended to state, county, and local governments
in master planning and zoning. They will be
encouraged to utilize the best modern techniques
for quality utilization, including preservation
of natural beauty and open space values, and
the prevention of uneconomic use and development of flood plains.'
Until the Secretary promulgated the 1976 regulations,
Interior Department regulations which controlled the exploration, mining, and reclamation of coal lands were con157. 30 U.S.C. § 189 (1970).
158. Texas Oil and Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 406 F.2d 1303 (10th
Cir.), cert. den., 396 U.S. 829 (1961).
159. On May 17, 1976, the Secretary noted adoption of the coal operating regOn
ulations proposed on September 5, 1976. 41 FED. REG. 20252 (1976).
June 1, 1976, the coal leasing regulations proposed on March 16, 1976, were
promulgated in 41 FED. REG. 22051 (1976).
160. 43 C.F.R. § 1725.2 (1975).
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sistent with the stated policy to leave land use regulation to
the states, even when the surface involved had been patented
to private use subject to federal mineral reservations. Part
23 of Subtitle A of Title 43 of the Code of Federal Regulations
contained regulations of surface exploration, surface mining,
and reclamation of mineral lands subject to the Mineral Leasing Act. The regulations expressly excluded from their
purview private lands underlain by federal coal:
(b) The regulations in this part do not cover...
minerals underlying lands, the surface of which is
not owned by the U.S. Government.'
Whether or not the Congress has the power to regulate
private lands underlain by federal coal, it should be plain
that Congress has not acted on it. Congress passed by an
opportunity to exclude state control of surface mining of
Congress failed to
federal coal underlying private lands.'
act with the knowledge of the coal leasing and operating regulations promulgated in May and June of 1976 by the Secretary of the Interior. This legislative silence would seem to fall
short of the need for "clear and manifest" legislative intent
to preempt state law. The crucial problem, thus, becomes
whether the Secretary of the Interior by rulemaking has expressed an intention to preempt state law and whether that
expression should have preemptive capability.
Interior Department Coal Lands Regulations
The administrative regimen has been thoroughly recast
by coal lands management regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of the Interior in the past few months. Two final
rules by the Interior Department would make unmistakably
clear federal intentions to regulate western coal lands, regardless of ownership of the surface overlying the federal
coal.' ' They restate federal objectives, which suggest reevaluation of the compatibility of state objectives. They
161. 43 C.F.R. § 23.2(b) (1975).
162. 90 Stat. 1083 (1976).
163. Department of Interior, Coal Mining Operating Regulations, 41 FED. REG.
20252 (1976); Department of Interior, Competitive Coal Leasing, 41 FED.
RnG. 22051 (1976).
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express a clear intention to move into a new regulatory field
in a different way. In short, the proposed regulations raise
more difficult questions of federal supremacy.
FEDERAL COAL MINING OPERATING REGULATIONS

By means of the rule adopted May 17, 1976, the Secretary
of the Interior proposed to move into land use regulation of
private lands overlying federal coal for the first time.16"
The rule would, first, amend Section 23 (b) of Title 43 of the
Code of Federal Regulations to exclude coal mining operations
from the surface exploration, mining, and reclamation regulations of Part 23. That Part is now supplanted by Part
3040 of the Regulations, contained in the rule. It is worth
noting that, by excluding coal mining from Part 23, the
proposed rule would seem to exclude also the operation of the
clear policy of deference to state land use regulation expressed in Part 23.114
Second, the May 17 final rulemaking expresses a clear
intention to sweep all lands overlying federal coal into its
coal exploration, mining, and reclamation regulations.
(b) It is the policy of the Department to encourage
the development of Federally owned coal, where
such development is authorized, through a program
that will provide for the protection, orderly development and conservation of Federal mineral and nonmineral resources in a manner that will avoid, minimize, or correct adverse impacts on society and the
environment resulting from coal development ....
Departmental policy regarding privately owned surface where the mineral estate is federally owned is
that any mineral activity on the private surface
should be conducted to result in protection of environmental values at least as stringent as would apply to Federally owned surface."'
The rule arrogates to the Director of the Bureau of
164. 40 FED. REG. 41123 (1975) (proposed rule); .41 FED. REG. 20252 (1976)
(final rule).
165. Compare 41 FED. REG. at 20273 (1976) with 43 C.F.R. § 23.2(b) (1975).
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Land Management (BLM) "in consultation with the GS
[Geological Survey], and the surface owner if other than
the United States . . ." the authority to incorporate into
leases, permits, and licenses the performance standards of
Part 3040.16 The enforcement of the regulations is to be
by BLM, United States Geological Survey, or other federal
The interests of the surface owner are
surface manager.'
to be considered by the federal surface manager,' prior to
the issuance of any coal lease, permit, or license:
[T]he authorized officer will consult with and receive and consider recommendations from the mining Supervisor or the federal surface managing
agency.. . or the surface owner, as to the terms and
conditions required to achieve the purpose of this
subpart." 9
The rule makes clear that states have no role in decisionmaking concerning mining and reclamation of lands subject
to proposed Part 3040. Rather, the policy is to arrogate to
the federal land management agencies the power to balance
state, local, and national energy and environmental values.'
The Secretary's brand of federalism is revealed by the following excerpt:
First, the relationship between federal and state
jurisdiction to impose reclamation standards has
arisen in the recently proposed legislation. On the
one hand, it is clear that the states have a direct
public policy interest in coal development within
their geographic boundaries. In addition the historical development of coal resources has in many
areas resulted in patterns of intermingled tracts
if federal and private ownership with respect to
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

41 FED. REG. 20253 (1976).
41 FED. REG. 20253 (1976).
41 FED. REG. 20253 (1976).
41 FED. REG. 20253 (1976).
The proposed rule would leave open the possibility that state reclamation
standards could be absorbed into permits and mining plans approved under
Part 3040. 41 FED. REG. 20273 (1976), proposed 43 C.F.R. § 211.75. Adoption of state standards will be by rulemaking following agency review of
state standards. See Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 41 FED.
REG. 27993 (1976).
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which coordinated regulatory mechanism would be
desirable.
On the other hand it is also clear that federal
coal resources belong not to one or more of the several states, but to the Nation as a whole. The federal interest in assuring the timely and orderly demust be implemented
velopment of such resources
71
with that end in mind.'
THE ENERGY MINERALS ACTIVITY RECOMMENDATION SYSTEM

The May 17, 1975 rulemaking sought to balance the
need for coal production and environmental protection at
the operations phase of the coal industry. On March 16,
1976, the Department of the Interior proposed EMARS to
serve similar interests at the resource disposal phase of the
industry.'72 The June 1, 1976 rulemaking would revise 43
C.F.R. Part 3520 to reflect the adoption of EMARS.
EMARS is a system designed to produce a decision by
BLM to recommend to the Secretary whether or not to issue
a requested coal lease. Previously, federal regulations failed
to assure consideration of the interests of the energy consumer, the resource owner, and the environment. The result
was that virtually all competitive coal lease requests were
granted. In addition, data revealed that federal coal leases
yielded very little coal production. Accordingly in 1972 competitive coal leasing was halted with the Secretary's Moratorium, and work was begun at the department level to set
some sort of policy. EMARS expresses the policy designed
to "permit resumption of coal leasing, as the need arises, in
a responsible way that protects the environment and the
interests of both the general public who own the resource,
and the energy consumers who will benefit by its use."'
EMARS synthesizes environmental, economic, and resource inputs from various federal land management agencies, the public at large, and the state governments. EMARS
171. 40 FED. REG. 41123 (1976).
172. Department of the Interior, Competitive Coal Leasing, 41 FE. REG. 11035
(1976) (proposed rulemaking), 41 FED. REG. 22051 (1976) (final rulemaking).
173. 41 FED. R G. 11035, 22051 (1976).
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sets out to act on those inputs by attempting to select tracts
for coal leasing in a manner which assures adequate coal
production at least environmental cost. Unlike the coal mine
operating regulations discussed above, which deny the states
a role, EMARS contemplates substantial role for the state
governments in decisionmaking. For purposes of this article
it is useful to trace, if only briefly, the state participation in
that process.
From the first stage of the process the state government
is involved. Its participation begins with the right to nominate "areas of interest" and to participate in analysis of
nominations from industry or the public." 4
[A]s part of EMARS, the regulations establish a call
for information and nominations stage that is a
major new vehicle enabling the public to inform the
Department in advance of any actual decision to
offer leases, where coal leasing is considered desirable and where it is not.' 5
The product of the nominations stage is a basic land use
plan which collates the public and state inputs against the
backdrop of the BLM Management Framework Plan, or
MFP. The MFP is itself an area by area land use plan
which
inventories not only minerals, but also other resource values such as agriculture, grazing, wildlife, recreation and water resources in specific
areas. It also analyzes the compatibility and conflicts of the varying land uses and provides guidelines for activities planning. '
...

Tentative tract selection, environmental analysis, tract
selection, leasing unit recommendations are all decisions
174. 41 FED. REG. 11037, Table I (1976). The final rulemaking eleminated the
so-called "two-tier tract nomination procedure." However, the states will be
asked to comment on tract nominations along with industry and the public
in a general, single-tiered call for nominations. See 41 FED. REG. 22051
(1976).
175. 41 FED. REG. 11036 (1976).
176. 41 FED. REa. 11036 (1076).
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made by the Secretary with consultation with the Governors
of the states affected.
IV.

BOTTOM LINE: PREEMPTION OF WYOMING
SURFACE MINING LEGISLATION

Now that the federal government has moved dramatically
to take charge of development of federal coal on public and
private land, the critical question is whether the courts
should accord the Secretary's effort preemptive capability.
The guidance from the Burger Court decisions suggests
that the answer to the question involves the resolution of three
issues: Whether the states have power to legislate the subject matter; whether the state law conflicts with federal
regulations and whether the Congress expressed a clear intent to occupy the field of regulating surface mining of federal coal.
Is State Regulation Repugnant to the Property Clause?
Article IV, Section 3, of the U.S. Constitution provides:
The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall
be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the
United States, or of any particular States.
The text of the clause provides no basis for federal exclusivity. Furthermore, whether exclusive federal power
may be inferred depends on a finding of "constitutional
repugnancy." The court in Goldstein v. California stated:
We must also be careful to distinguish those situations in which the concurrent exercise of a power by
the Federal Government and the States or by the
States alone may possibly lead to conflicts and those
situations where conflicts will necessarily arise.'77
There simply is no serious dispute that the states may
regulate surface mining under the police power. The Su177. Goldstein v. California, supra note 131 at 554.
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preme Court in Omaechevarriav. State of Idaho, and in McKelvey v. United States,"" held to what it ascertained to be
settled law that the states are free to prescribe police regulations over the public lands. Last term the Supreme Court in
Kleppe v. New Mexico, "7 ' reiterated the principle in holding
that states and the Congress share power to regulate wild
animals on public lands. In light of long standing judicial
construction and legislative and administrative regulation
with reference to it, it is hard to justify at this date a
finding that the exercise of the police power over public lands
suffers from constitutional repugnancy. 8 '
The remaining limit then is the supremacy clause.
The Wyoming surface mining legislation is void under the
supremacy clause, if it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' 8 ' The state scheme may be held to be
such an obstacle if it clashes with federal law or if it intrudes into a field of regulation which the Congress has
claimed to be its exclusive province.
Does the State Legislation Clash with Federal Regulations?
State legislation may be voided under the supremacy
clause when the objectives of the state legislature are incompatible with the objectives of the federal scheme.
The Secretary of the Interior enjoys broad discretion
to dispose of the public lands under the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920.182 The Secretary has stated the objectives of the
coal mining operating regulations as follows:
(b) It is the policy of the department to encourage
the development of federally owned coal where such
development is authorized through a program that
178. Supra note 118.
U.S .-...... 96 Sup. Ct. 2285 (1976).
179.
180. See New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino, supra note
134 at 421.
181. Hines v. Davidowitz, supra note 130. See also Kewanee Oil Company v.
Bicron Corporation, supra note 149, at 479; Goldstein v. California, supra
note 131.
182. 41 Stat. 437 (1920), 30 U.S.C. § 181 et. seq. (1970).
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will provide for the protection, orderly development
and conservation of federal mineral and non-mineral resources in a manner that will avoid, minimize
or correct adverse impacts on society and the environment resulting from coal development, without
undue duplication or administrative delay by federal
officers. It is also the policy of the department to
issue leases, permits, and licenses for coal only
where the reclamation of the affected lands to the
standard set forth herein is attainable and assured
and reclamation program will be undertaken as contemporaneously as practicable with operations. Departmental policy regarding privately owned surface where the mineral estate is federally owned
is that any mineral activity on the private surface
should be conducted in protection of environmental
values which is at least as stringent as would apply
to federally owned surface. 8 '
The stated objectives of the Interior Department's coal
leasing program (EMARS) are "the orderly and timely development of federally owned coal; appropriate use of the
resources; effective environmental protection; and a fair
market return to the public for resources sold."' 84
The stated objectives of the Wyoming Environmental
Quality Act are declared to be:
To enable the State to prevent, reduce and eliminate
pollution; to preserve, and enhance the air, water
and reclaim the land of Wyoming; to plan the development, use, reclamation, preservation and enhancement of the air, land and water resources of
the state; to preserve and exercise the primary responsibilities and rights of the state of Wyoming; to
retain for the state control over its air, land and
water and to secure cooperation from agencies of
the state, agencies of other states, interstate agencies, and the federal government in carrying out
these objectives. 8 '
183.

Department of the Interior, Coal Mining Operating Regulations, 41 FED.
REG. 20252, 20253 (1976).
184. Department of the Interior, Competitive Coal Leasing, 41 FED. REG. 22051,
22053 (1976).
185. WYo. STAT. § 35-502.2 (Supp. 1975).
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The objectives seem complimentary. Each sovereignty,
the state pursuant to its police power and federal government
pursuant to article I and IX of the Constitution, is pursuing
a common goal: the orderly development of coal resources
at least environmental cost. To be sure, there exists risk
that the state's balance of the factors might work a result
different from that of the Interior Department. In the
Burger Court, that risk has been an insufficient basis for
preemption. In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,
Inc., 8 it was not a mere risk that the respective statutory
objectives would be applied inconsistently. Rather, in Burbank the objectives themselves were found to be totally inconsistent. The objectives of the ordinance was a somnolent
constituency. The objectives of the Federal Aviation Administration was efficient air traffic management. It is also true
that the stated federal objectives are specifically directed toward the development of coal resources, while the state objectives are more generally directed toward orderly development of its air, land, and water resources. However, the
187 had
Court in Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron Corporation,
no quarrel with the broadly stated policies of general application which supported the Ohio Trade Secret Law. 8 '
Even if the statutory objectives are complimentary,
there may be, nevertheless, conflict arising from the interaction of the two regulatory systems. On private land held
subject to federal coal reservations, reside Wyoming's most
vocal constituency. There exists an undeniably legitimate
state interest in legislating with respect to private lands,
and Wyoming has compiled a substantial legislative record
in pursuit of it. By extending its regulation at both the
leasing and the operating stages of the coal mining industry
to private lands underlain by federal coal, the Interior Department has introduced a quantum leap in the risk of conflict between federal and state regulatory schemes.
Both the state and the federal regulatory schemes involve the granting, the enforcement, and possible revocation
186. Supra note 134.
187. Supra note 149.
188. Id. at 482.
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of mining permits and licenses. There exists a possibility
that the director of the Department of Environmental Quality could thwart both EMARS and the coal mining operating
regulations by denying a federal permittee a mining permit
or license under state law. The director of the D.E.Q. may
deny a mining permit for any one of the following reasons:
(i) the application is incomplete; (ii) the applicant
has not properly paid the required fee; (iii) any
part of the proposed operation, reclamation program
or the proposed future use is contrary to the law or
policy of this state or the United States; (iv) the
proposed mining operation would irreparably harm,
destroy or materially impair any area that has been
designated by the council to be of a unique and irreplaceable, historical, archeological, scenic or natural value; (v) if the proposed mining operation
will cause pollution of any water in violation of the
laws of this state or of the federal government; (vi)
if the applicant has had any other permit or license
issued hereunder revoked or any bond posted to
comply within this act forfeited; (vii) the proposed
operation constitutes a public nuisance or endangers
the public health and safety; (viii) the affected
land lies with 3,000 feet of any existing occupied
dwelling, home, public building, school, church, community or institutional buildings, park or cemetery,
unless the land owner's consent has been obtained.
The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to
operations conducted under an approved permit issued by the State Land Commissioner in compliance
with the open-cut Mine Land Reclamation Act of
1969; (ix) the operator is unable to produce the
bonds required; (x) if written objections are filed
by an interested person under subsection (f) of this
section. (xi) if information in the application or information obtained through director's investigation
shows that the reclamation cannot be accomplished
consistent with the purposes and provisions of this
act; (xii) if the applicant has been and continues
to be in violation of the provisions of this act; (xiii)
no permit shall be denied on the basis that the applicant has been in actual violation of the provisions
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol12/iss1/2
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of this act if the violation has been corrected or discontinued.'
A second area of potential conflict exists with regard
to the contents of mining permits and licenses issued under
state law and those under the federal regulations. The critical component in the mining permit under state law is the
reclamation plan. 19 It is the stated policy of the Secretary
of the Interior that privately owned surface subject to federal coal reservations should be environmental protection "at
least as stringent as would apply to federally owned surface."' " However, the federal regulations leave open the
possibility that stricter reclamation standards under state
law may not be adopted or incorporated into licenses and
mining plans under federal law. The Secretary has some
discretion in the matter if, following review of state reclamation standards,
The Secretary determines that the requirements of
the laws and regulations of any such state afford
general protection of environmental quality and
values at least as stringent as would occur under exclusive application of this part, he shall be rulemaking direct that the requirements of such state laws
and regulations thereafter be applied as conditions
upon the approval of any proposed exploration or
mining plan, unless (1) the Secretary determines
that such application of the requirements of such
laws and regulations would unreasonably and substantially prevent the mining of federal coal in such
state, and (2) the Secretary determines that it is
in the overriding national interest that such coal be
produced without such application of such requirements. In any such determination of overriding
national interest, the Secretary will consult in advance of such determination
with the governor of
192
the state involved.
A third area of possible conflict, in extreme cases closer
to actual conflict, is the state's reallignment of the rights of
189.
190.

WYO. STAT. § 35-502.24(g) (Supp. 1975).
See WYO. STAT. § 35-502.24(b) (Supp. 1975).
41 FED. REG. 20252, 20253 (1976).

191.
192. 41 FED. REG. 20252, 20273 (1976).
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the surface owner against the mineral owner. First, the
surface owner, upon a showing that mining would substantially prohibit his operations, or an obstinate "resident
or agricultural landowner" might veto the mining permit
under state law. The state law does entitle the surface owner
to damage "commensurate with the reasonable value of the
surrounding land. . . ."'
In addition, the damages under
the bonding provisions are recoverable annually as they accrue.1 94 The state law would appear to reverse the balance
struck by settled rules of Barker v. Mintz, 9 ' Kinney Coastal Oil Co. v. Kiefer; ' and Holbrook v. Continental Oil Company." 7 Under Sections 35-502.12 and 35-502.33 of Wyoming Statutes, the surface owner can in effect enjoin mining
operations upon a showing of substantial prohibition of his
own operations, and his damages are not limited to damages
to crops, forage, and improvements. However, after Askew
v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.' these provisions
of the Wyoming Statutes appear less likely to be construed
as conflicts than justifiable reordering of remedies."'
In anticipation of controversies which might arise over
permits, mining licenses, reclamation bonds, and reclamation
standards, it is difficult to find an immediate and actual
conflict.
The meaning that should attach to these potential conflicts is not yet clear. The Burger Court has not had occasion to consider squarely the continued viability of the potential conflict ground of Pennsylvania v. Nelson.' ° Askew v.
American Waterways Operators,Inc., appears to suggest a
departure from the potential conflict standard. While recognizing that state and private claims for cleanup of oil
spills might exceed the limits in the federal act, the court
refused to preempt absent a clear and actual conflict, observ193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

WYO. STAT. § 35-502.33 (Supp. 1975).
WYo. STAT. § 35-502.33 (Supp. 1975).
Supra note 25.
277 U.S. 48 (1928).
73 Wyo. 321, 278 P.2d 798 (1955).
Supra note 135.
Id. at 341.
350 U.S. 497 (1956).
See, in general, the textual discussion accompanying
footnote 134.
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This analysis leaves aside the argument that the state
statutory remedies are so burdensome to federal lessees and
licensees who, without notice of the state law, relied on reasonable expectations of the dominance of the mineral estate
that they amount to an impairment of the contract between
the federal government and the licensees and permittees.
Such impairments may be abrogated under familiar rules
of conflicts of laws. 2
Has the Congress Expressed an Intent to Occupy the Field?
The preemption doctrine may be invoked to invalidate
state legislation when the Congress has set aside a regulatory
field as its own exclusive province. 20 ° The Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920 contains the mandate to the Secretary of the
Interior to dispose of leasable minerals in the public domain.
That act provides that "[n]othing in this Chapter shall be
construed or held to affect the rights of the States or any
other local authority to exercise any rights which they might
have.... 2 4 In addition, the Secretary's statements of disposal policy express a similar solicitude for states' interests."'
Neither EMARS nor the coal mine operating regulations
contain any language which can be fairly construed as the
"clear and unmistakable intent" to exclude the states from
the regulatory field required to measure up to the standards
for express intent to preempt the states. 00
Taken alone, the statute may be fairly construed to
express an intent not to preempt the states. Without more,
such a construction would be enough to support non-preemption. 0' When an agency promulgates regulations which au201. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., supra note 135, at 336.
202. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., Inc., 412 U.S. 580 (19'73).
203. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., supra note 134; Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Co., supra note 131.
204. 30 U.S.C. § 189 (1970).
205. See text accompanying footnote 160.
206. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963);
see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, supra note
134, at 139.
207. Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974).
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thorize a federal intrusion into a regulatory field hitherto
occupied by the states, federal courts, to be consistent with the
emerging "cooperative federalism," should be reluctant to invoke the preemption doctrine.0 8
Under a construction most favorable to preemption, at
the least, the signals are ambiguous. Therefore, if preemption will be invoked to invalidate Wyoming's surface mining
regulations, a congressional intent to occupy the field must
be inferred from the regulated subject matter."0 9
In New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino,
because the state interest in providing work incentives as a
condition to entitlement under the A.F.D.C. program was
substantial and because the federal scheme contemplated a
complementary administration by the federal and state agencies, the Court imposed a stiffer burden on those challenging
the state legislation. The evidence showed that the New
York Work Rules excluded persons eligible for assistance
under the federal standards. 1 Yet the Court found that evidence insufficient.
In sum our attention has been directed to no relevant
argument which supports, except in the most peripheral way, the view that Congress intended, either
expressly or impliedly, to preempt state work programs. Far more would be required to show the
"clear manifestation of [congressional] intention" which must exist before a federal statute is
held "to supersede the exercise of state action." '
In Dublino, the Court was not explicit as to what combination of facts would trigger the revived strict intent standard. The Dublino Court thought important a pattern of
cooperative administration. The stated policies of both the
Department of the Interior and the State of Wyoming call
for cooperation between federal and state governments. The
208. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 212 (1971).
209. Cf. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, supra note 206; City
of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
210. See New York State Dept of Social Services v. Dublino, supra note 134, at
423-424 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall).
211. Id. at 417.
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EMARS machinery and, less clearly the coal mine operating
regulations, contemplate an interlacing of administrative machinery. EMARS and the operating regulations represent a
novel effort by the Interior Department to enter a regulatory
field up to now left to the states. The Secretary's mandate
under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 calls for solicitude
for state and local interests. Even granting that the Secretary is within his authority by intruding upon the state's surface mining regulations, and that the Secretary's regulations
are not so far afield as to fall outside "the shadow of the
federal umbrella," ' the importance of the state interest
and its "squatter's rights" would justify raising Dublino's
strict intent standard before sweeping away an ongoing
state regulatory program.
The Bottom Line
If Wyoming surface mining legislation is to be preempted, it must be on the ground that clear manifestation of
congressional intent to occupy the field can be inferred from
the pervasivness of the federal scheme, repugnance to the
federal objectives, or from the overriding preeminence of
the federal interests.213
The starting point must be with a presumption in favor
of constitutionality of the state's exercise of the police power.
In Rice the Court began:
We start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the states were not to be superseded by the
federal act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of congress.214
Preemption may be invoked when the state policies may
produce a result inconsistent with the federal objectives. In
Burbank, the curfew ordinance worked a result exhibiting
more than the possibility of inconsistency with the objectives
of the federal regulatory scheme. In Burbank the incon212. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. v. Ware, supra note 134,
at 130-131.
213. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. supra note 134; Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra note 131.
214. Id. at 230.
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sistency was total. There is, of course, obvious risk that
the Wyoming regulatory system might work results inconsistent with those of the Interior Department. Without more,
that risk has been insufficient to invoke preemption. In
Goldstein, Kewanee, Dublino, and even in Burbank, state regulations producing results inconsistent with the federal solution were insufficient to support the inference that Congress
intended to exclude the states from the regulatory field.
Preemption may be inferred from the pervasiveness of
the federal regulatory scheme. The federal historical stake
in air traffic regulation and in labor relations so prominent
in Burbank and in the labor cases, 15 cuts against preemption
of state control over surface mining. The states have long
applied the police power to both the public domain and to
private lands held subject to federal mineral reservations.
To be sure the high degree of concern for the environmental
impact of surface mining is one shared by the federal government and the state. However the distinction between surface
mining controls and the subject matter of Burbank, Austin,
and Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission is too obvious to belabor, since it is the Interior Department belatedly
entering a field of regulation already occupied by the state.
Pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme can be inferred
from the subject matter itself. In Burbank the Court pointed
out that aircraft and noise are inseparable.
The Federal Aviation Act requires a delicate balance
between safety and efficiency [citation omitted]
and the protection of persons on the ground. [Citation omitted.] Any regulations adopted by the administrator to control noise pollution must be consistent with the highest degree of safety. [Citation
omitted.] The interdependence of these factors
requires a uniform and exclusive system of federal
regulation if the congressional objectives underlying
the Federal Aviation Act are to be fulfilled.2 1
Old Dominion Branch Number 496, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
AFL-CIO v. Austin, supra note 149; Lodge 76, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wisconsin Employment
, 96 S. Ct. 2548 (1976).
U.S. Relations Commission,
216. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., supra note 134 at 639.
215.
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The orderly development of federal coal resources involves
the same sort of trade-offs. The task of the Department of
the Interior is to optimize its mutually exclusive objectives to
protect, develop, and conserve resources in a manner minimizenvironmental impact and undue administrative
ing adverse
2 17
delay.
The federal regulatory scheme may be construed to be
sufficiently pervasive to support preemption, if it appears
that the federal scheme is so comprehensive that it does not
admit to supplementary regulations by the states. 18 The
Wyoming Environmental Quality Act regulates surface mining through a permit and license system. It calls for annual
reports by the mine operator and continuous supervision of
the terms of the mining licenses and permits. The WEQ
provides extensive surface owner protection by affording him
statutory damage remedies and a mechanism for recovering
surface damage on a periodic basis. Where the surface owner
can show substantial prohibition to his own operations, or
when he meets the statutory definition of a "resident or agricultural landowner", he can exercise a veto over a mining
permit or license. The state system provides for extensive
private enforcement of the sanctions contained in the Act.
The state program does not impinge directly on tract selection or leasing under EMARS; to the extent that the surface
owner stands as an obstacle in obtaining mining permits and
mining licenses under state law, the WEQ doubtless influences nominations of tracts in the early stages of EMARS.
The federal program is comprehensive in the sense that
it shepherds tract selection, leasing, operations, and reclamation of lands underlain by federal coal. The federal program
does not reach privately owned "fee coal." The federal program polices its leases either through the terms of the leases
or through approval or rejection of the mining and reclamation plan. The federal program considers state interests
through EMARS. However, the federal program husbands
21-7. 41 FED. RM. 20252, 20253 (1976).
218. New York State Dept of Social Services v. Dublino, supra note 134, at 419,
421-422.
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its own overriding national interests in the coal mining operating regulations, except to the extent that state reclamation
standards may find their way into federal mining plans.
Even this superficial comparison of the state and federal schemes reveals that these are not parallel programs.
Yet there is an area of substantial overlap in that each administrative system produces a decision to mine or not to
mine based on an independent calculus of economic and environmental costs and benefits. The cases in the Burger
Court are not clear about the meaning that should be ascribed
to such an overlap. In Burbank the Court found legislative
history suggesting that noise control through curfew was
part of the mandate of the Environmental Protection Agency
in the Noise Control Act. 1 The ordinance overlapped that
authority. In Askew the federal scheme provides no remedy
for the state government or for private citizens. Therefore,
state legislation creating a right of action to recoup cleanup
costs and losses resulting from oil spills was viewed to be
mere gap-filling. In Dublino the statute contemplated local
administration and diversity in result. But in Goldstein and
Kewanee actual overlap was not enough to justify preemption
where there was no "real possibility" that the objectives of
the patent laws would be thwarted. Distilling the cases, one
is tempted to cling to the learning that overlap of programs
may indicate a pervasive federal regulatory scheme, when the
overlap is coupled with a genuine possibility that the federal
objectives may be thwarted. Thus the fact of overlap would
appear to be an inconclusive, but important factor to consider
in determining whether or not the federal regulatory scheme
is sufficiently pervasive to justify setting aside a state regulatory effort.
An intent to exclude the state may be inferred from the
preeminence of the federal interest over the state interest.
The legitimacy of the state interest seems undeniable. The
tradition of local influence in federal mining law is a venerable one. State courts have enjoyed concurrent jurisdiction
219. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. supra note 184, at 637
(1973).
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from the beginning. Many federal questions in mining law
are themselves dependent upon state law.220 Part three of
this article discussed the history of the police power on the
public lands. When the land has been patented to private
hands subject to mineral reservations, the state's reliance
interest in its police power seems still greater. Further, the
state government is directly affected by the social costs attendant to industrialization. Yet the record of extractive
industries providing an adequate tax base to cover them is
not likely to inspire unbridled enthusiasm for development,
even when one considers the state's growing share of federal
royalties from mineral leases.
The agricultural interests tend to feel threatened by
mineral development. They argue with some appeal that
their reasonable expectations attached to surface patents
subject to reservations of the coal did not include the expectation of strip mining, since the technology at the time of their
patents warned only of deep mining. They feel they have
assumed the risks of subsidence, but not destruction of their
grazing lands. Perhaps the strongest state interest is to
retain a reasonable control over a way of life unique to the
Rocky Mountain West. The people of the western states
are being asked to give up a measure of values most easterners cannot comprehend. These are values asked in exchange
for what to many westerners may seem a dubious privilege
of citizens of Chicago, Seattle, Denver, and Los Angeles to
live free from "brownouts." They are values worth considering. The citizens of those states have a strong interest
in having their state government doing the considering. ° a
But there is a national stake in the development of western coal that is likewise unrelenting. The nation has a proprietary interest in the coal; it is still in the public domain.
The people of Chicago, Seattle, Denver, and Los Angeles
might feel entitled to take the western coal, because in a sense
220. See generally, Sherwood and Greer, Mining Law, in a Nuclear Age: The
Wyoming Example, eupra note 8; and Sherwood and Greer, Possessory Interests in Wyoming Mineral Claims, aupra note 8.
220a. See NEHRING AND ZYCHER, COAL DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION IN THE NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS: A PRELIMINARY REPORT (1976).
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it is their coal. It is argued that the proprietary interest,
as distinguished from a "sovereign" interest has less preemptive capacity when placed against the state's police power 2 '
The distinction appears to be of little use in a case involving
preemption of state surface mining controls. Modern cases
have not been faithful to the distinction." Rather the cases
speak of plenary power of the Congress to dispose of public
lands."' Certainly the mining of federal coal is what disposing of coal resources is all about.
The federal interest is not so easily disposed of for still
another reason. The federal power to regulate surface mining of federal coal on or off public lands finds its source beyond the property clause. EMARS and the coal mining
operating regulations find their mandate not only in the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, but also in the National Environmental Policy Act which itself emanates from the commerce clause of the Constitution.224 The federal interest
becomes even more compelling because of its national security
impact. Energy security not only of the United States but
of its allies and western Europe is dependent upon a high degree of energy independence.2 2 5 Energy independence in
turn rests at least for the rest of this century on successful development of western coal. The Supreme Court has been far
from reticent in according preemptive capability on facts suggesting state intrusion, however attenuated, into foreign affairs.226
Persuasive arguments can be made that the federal regime itself supports an inference of congressional intent to
clear the states from enforcing their own surface mining
controls when the minerals involved belong to the United
States. There exists a clear possibility that enforcement
221. See

BARRY,

EXTENT OF STATE

CONTROL

OvER RECLAMATION

ON

FEDERAL

(Western Governor's Regional Energy Policy Office) 13 (1976).
See Utah Power and Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917); Federal Power Comm'n. v. Idaho Power Co., supra note 113; Transwestern
Pipeline Company v. Kerr-McGee Corp., supra note 77.
Federal Power Comm. v. Idaho Power Co., supra note 113.
See Department of the Interior, Coal Mining Operating Regulations, 41
FED. REC. 20252, 20253 (1976).
See Willrich, Energy Independence for America, 52 INT'L AFFAIRS 53, 57
(1976).
Zschernig v. Miller, supra note 131.-LANDS

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
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of state law by the Department of Environmental Quality
may yield results inconsistent with federal objectives. Despite the fact that the state legislation and the federal regulations overlap only partially, EMARS and the coal mining
operating regulations may be fairly read to be pervasive,
since the partial overlap is coupled with a genuine possibility
of conflict. Tract selection and approval of mining operation involves a balancing of environmental and economic
costs and benefits. Little may be gained from diversity here.
Indeed, the orderly development of federal coal reserves requires uniformity in development policy. Among the critical factors which should order the progress of development
are those built in to the EMARS tract selection process:
Depth, quality, thickness, and extent of the coal resource; resource accessibility; competitive situation; value of existing land uses; relation to existing
communities; potential impacts on economic structures (e.g. employment, available services, etc.);
service and access corridors; and rehabilitation potential.227
It is plain that independent calculus of the factors may well
yield disparate conclusions about which tracts should be
mined first. Orderly development of the region should not
be restrained by state boundary lines, let alone local regulations. Orderly coal development should start with those resources accessible at the least total social cost. State and local
land use plans might well encourage development in areas
in which state and local government squawk least, not those
which cost least.
Federal supremacy in the coal lands would wreak havoc
in Wyoming's plans to control surface mining. The federal
concern is to control, with state government influence, the
siting of mining tracts and to regulate with some state participation the operating of the mines and reclamation of the
coal lands. There is room for the state to assert its interest
in the federal scheme. There is much room beyond the
siting and operating of coal mines, where the state might con227. See 41 FED. REG. 22054.
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trol growth and development. However, enforcement of
state environmental standards more stringent than federal
standards or determinations by the state which have the effect of withdrawing land from coal production"' would place
a more serious clog on the federal regulatory process. In
Wyoming 40% of the federal coal lies beneath private lands;
in North Dakota that figure is 98%."' Federal regulations
trammeled by hostile state regulations on such large blocks of
land might well nullify the federal scheme.
Finally, the federal interests in national security, environmental protection, and this proprietary interest in disposing of the public lands together might well be held to predominate over the state police power.
Each of the factors which the court has used to infer an
intent to preempt state legislation appears on these facts.
Nevertheless courts should not be quick to read a preemptive
intent into federal legislation.23 ° The Secretary of the Interior has a mandate under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920
to show solicitude toward state interests. " ' The EMARS
program contemplates interaction between state and federal
agencies. Accordingly under Dublino the preemptive capacity of EMARS should be slight. However, under the coal
mining operating regulations the Secretary of the Interior
showed little solicitude toward state interests in regulating
the mining operations and reclamation. Certainly one may
infer that the Secretary may have intended greater preemptive effect in his coal mining and operating regulations.
Whether that agency intent should be imputed to the Congress
is a more difficult question. The state interests are legitimate
and pressing. The end of "cooperative federalism" would
not be well served by federal courts setting aside state legisla228. For example, the state might regard the mine operator's reclamation plan
as inadequate, or find that mining might impair an area determined to -be
of unique historical, archaeological, scenic or natural value; further an
objecting surface owner who can show a substantial prohibition of his
operations. See Wyo. STAT. § 35-502.24(g) (Supp. 1975).
229. Hearings on S.391 before the Subconam. on Minerals, Materials and Fuels
of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st. Sess.,
Table I, App. I, at 570 (1975).
230. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
231. 30 U.S.C. § 189 (1970).
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tion on the strength of an intent inferred from administrative
regulations." 2
V.

CONCLUSION

Persuasive arguments favor preemption. At the same
time, in the absence of special facts presenting clear conflict
between state and federal programs, preemption must be
grounded on congressional intent inferred from action by the
Secretary of the Interior. When even the Secretary's intent
to exclude the states must be inferred from the federal program itself, the element of congressional intent, the touchstone of the preemption doctrine, becomes a mere fiction. In
such circumstances the case for accommodation of the two
regulatory regimes is strong.
As applied to state surface mining legislation traditional
renderings of the preemption doctrine have all the utility of
a sledge hammer in repair of an antique clock. To preempt
the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act so far as it applies
to lands underlain by federal coal would lead to an administration of different reclamation standards and disparate remedial options for surface owners throughout the state.
Since a single coal mining operation is likely to involve both
fee coal and federal coal, total preemption of the state program would burden a single mine operator with compliance
with a complex of administrative procedures and substantive
regulations. To let the state program stand in its entirety is
to put sizable obstacles in the way of the federal program.
What is called for is a fine-tuning of the two regulatory
schemes. Accommodation may be achieved through a selective application of the preemption doctrine. The Supreme
Court has favored a cautious approach to preemption, staying
its hand in anticipation of close review of the interfaces of
state and federal legislative schemes. In Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., the Supreme Court was invited to limit application of the preemption doctrine only so far as the state law
232. Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, supra note 208.
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applied to clearly patentable technologies. It rejected the
argument on the ground that it forced state courts into the
ungainly position of determining whether a technology defined as a trade secret under state law was also a patentable
discovery under federal law.
A selective application of the preemption doctrine to
Wyoming surface mining legislation is not attended by such
entanglement of the state and federal systems. Rather, it
is necessary only to determine the areas of overlap and to determine whether the overlap presents a clear threat to the
purposes of Congress. Overlap between the WEQ and the federal coal leasing and operating regulations exists in that each
system requires permits and licenses, which assure approval
of mining and reclamation plans and a means of enforcing
their terms. The overlap does present a clear possibility that
federal objectives may be thwarted. Upon a showing that
mining will prohibit substantially surface operations, a surface owner may block mining operations authorized under the
federal regulations. State administrators may in effect
withdraw lands from mining, when the mining and reclamation proposals fail to meet state standards, stricter than federal standards but not incorporated into federal mining plans.
Finally, an overlap is presented by a determination under
state law that mining would destroy unique historical, cultural, or archeological values. Under these circumstances,
preemption should be invoked to the extent state law renders
unminable tracts approved for coal mining under federal law.
Outside the zone of overlap the state would be free to
operate under the WEQ. The state could carry on its continuous supervision of the mining and reclamation operations.
Statutory damages, measured by the reasonable value of the
surface, would be unaffected. The state's private enforcement remedies would remain intact. Selective preemption
of Wyoming surface mining regulations serves the developing
concept of "cooperative federalism." National and state interests are accommodated. An established state program
need not be set aside on the strength of an attenuated attribution of congressional intent.
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